This situation if not stopped, will not only render the Assemblies impotent but will also erode the confidence people have in them as providers of the essential services. Another foreseeable threat to decentralization in Ghana is the sustainability of ceded fund from government to the Assemblies.
Per Act , Assemblies are given power to generate funds internally to prosecute their development agenda. The Assemblies should therefore find innovative ways of generating funds locally like the collection of property rates and market rates among others.
Electing Chiefs Executives Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives are the direct appointed representatives of the Executive President in the respective two hundred and thirty local assemblies in Ghana.
That notwithstanding, any of them can be called off their duty at the whims of the President. The power to appoint and fire any of them rest in the bosom of the President. The commitment and competence of most of these appointees have come under strict scrutiny as most have been found more loyal to their party than the governed. A Constitutional Review Committee was formed in to review the Constitution of Ghana and make recommendations to the government thereafter.
The Local Assemblies have effectively been turned into an extension of the party offices of the ruling party depending on which of the parties is in power. In response to this recommendation, the government has issued a white paper stating that Ghana as a country is not ready to welcome the challenges that come with electing Chief Executives for the respective Local Assemblies. Chief among the fears of government is that, it will be highly impossible to have representatives you can trust especially in areas where opposition parties are stronger.
A case is also made that such an election will be overly partisan contrary to chapter 20 of the constitution and the Local Government principles. Another issue has to do with the additional financial burden it poses to the central government. The government has rather proposed that five 5 people from the ruling party will be nominated amongst which one will be elected as Chief Executive. Under this new establishment, substitutes will be ready to take over your office immediately party surrogates cry foul.
Again it fails to cure the existing situation where local assemblies have been made an extension of party offices. There is a need for a paradigm shift from the appointment of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executive Officers.
They must be elected to make them more accountable to their people and also forestall the fear of being removed from office should they fail to kowtow to the caprices of party surrogates at the Local level.
This will make them less responsive to pressure from the central government and will be able to focus on the developmental agenda of their localities. In this case, they will be able to take the necessary decisions which might be politically unpopular with the central government.
Conclusion Generally, People who are found to have embezzled public funds should be made to refund the money and also be prosecuted. Stealing funds meant for developmental projects should be made an expensive venture. Another major issue has to do with voter turnout in Assembly elections vis a vis National elections. Specifics on how to finance African cities have not been studied. The actual scale of this market has not been fully grasped. A systemic approach to this market is difficult because of its diversity country size; institutional context; characteristics of urban network; availability of capital market, currency, etc.
What is the best way to transform these systems, often antiquated in many respects, into modern financing systems that facilitate access to domestic markets, mobilize local savings and reinforce local government autonomy? There is no single answer to this question in regard to such a variety of institutional and economic contexts.
The main objective of the study is to clarify the debates and to enlighten the choices of African decision-makers at local and national level. With governance high on the agenda in Africa, many governments are using ICTs to introduce innovations in their structure, practices, and capacities as well as in the ways they use human capital and deliver services to citizens. However, the potential for e-governance in Africa remains largely unexploited. Progress requires infrastructure improvement, the enactment of appropriate laws and policies, and capacity and content development.
This book addresses the lack of evidence on ICTs in local governance in Africa and provides an important collection of studies and analyses on the transformative potential of ICT. Often facing limited budgets, those tasked with managing African cities require empirical evidence on the nature of demands for infrastructure, escalating environmental hazards, and ever-expanding informal settlements. Drawing on the work of the African Urban Research Initiative, this book brings together contributions from local researchers investigating key themes and challenges within their own contexts.
He reoccupied his capital, pardoned the rebel leaders, and allowed them to return to Kumasi, but only after they had accepted new limitations on their power. The strong central authority of Asante was itself the product of a historical process. Decentralization was within the overall context of a liberal democratic constitution, yet essential democratic ele- ments remained compromised, especially through the retention of presidential appointments instead of local elections in the districts.
The objective of decentralization was specifically laid out in the Republican Constitution chapter twenty , which is entirely devoted to the concept of decentralization and local government administration in Ghana. The overall goal was to redress the over-centralization of power at the national level, improve the rural—urban imbalance and enhance local participation in national decision making Ahwoi, ; This study reflects upon decentralization practice in Ghana by assessing the key challenges inherent in the system.
In order to critically assess it, the study is situated within the qualitative paradigm of social research, which is deemed appropriate for exploratory and explana- tory studies Babbie, The study relies on secondary data and existing relevant literature on decentralization practice. The study, therefore, adopts a retrospective policy analysis by critically assessing the various poli- cies as well as legal frameworks that regulate decentralization and local government systems in Ghana.
A critical stage review method was used to analyse written reports, journal articles and other relevant literature on decentralization practice. Decentralization is a term of rich conceptual and empirical meaning, which can designate static fact and dynamic process, and it can refer to pure ideal-type and moderate incremental change when the rational theory of decentralization is understood in all compartments Fesler, ; cited in Antwi-Boasiako, In other words, the various ways with which decentralization is practiced to a greater extent deviates from what the literature provides.
A conspicuous trend in Ghana is that, whether civilian or military, the centre or president has always appointed favourites as chief executives in the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies MMDAs with little input from the local electorates Antwi-Boasiako, With the Fourth Republican Dispensation, the Constitution sets the stage for a subservient local government or DA system in Ghana.
The provisions tend to make the DAs tools or instruments of central government; as such the DAs are not primarily responsible to the local peo- ple but to the centre. What is more problematic is Article 1 2a—c , which places the DA into the direct ambit and control of the president. This constitutional provision is quite problem- atic because the concept of representation is very complex.
Being a representative is quite vague: is he to be given instructions to be executed in the districts? Or is he a trustee? A simple agency model argues that the representative ought to do the bidding of the appointing body. The present situation, therefore, leads to such appointees being caught between two sides: the local people whom they are to serve and the appointing agent.
This tends to make the local units very weak in terms of autonomy and taking their own initiatives. According to Wolman , small democratic local governments were the fundamental hope of the people, as most of them distrusted the activities of the central government. Bobo and Gilliam argue that local involvement in the political process through elections ensures self-empowerment as locals gain more political power.
Ghana is on record as making some progress in implementing decentralization. Therefore, allowing locals to elect their own leaders or public officials makes government more accountable to the local populations Duncan, and more responsive to local concerns. Unfavourable provisions in the legal framework The statute books of Ghana contain a lot of centralizing factors most of them of colonial and early post-colonial heritage that have hindered effective and autonomous local government, and have sought to make the DAs more subservient to the centre.
Per the Local Government Act, Act , the non-elected members of the assembly are not responsible to or accountable to local people, and the grassroots have no direct control over these individuals. This point has been brought home by section 9 of the Local Government Act. However, such a process cannot be initiated against the appointed members of the assembly. Therefore, who is accountable or responsible to who? Could this not affect the capacity and autonomy of the local governments in Ghana?
Section 10 6a of Act appears to directly place the activities of the District Assemblies DAs into the control and direction of the president or central government. Even though section 62 of the Act empowers the MMDAs to make byelaws on sanitation, drainage, control of construction and buildings and other petty issues, section 80 of that same Act argues that these byelaws are valid only subject to the discretion of the Minister for LGRD.
Section 88 also enjoins the DAs not to raise drafts or loans for greater than twenty million cedis old cedis or currently two thousand Ghana Cedis without permission from the minister of LGRD. Inadequate autonomy to initiate the district development planning process A linchpin of decentralization and local government is the enhancement of self-determination of local communities through the formulation and adoption of responsive services.
However, the National Development Planning System Act, Act appears to render the local governments second place in decentralized planning. The Act provides that the decentralized national development planning system shall be regulated by legislative instruments and guidelines issued by the NDPC. Section 11 a of the Act provides that NDPC shall determine the format and content of deve1opment plans for the districts, ministries and sector agencies.
This provision appears to render the MMDAs to the general control and direction of the president or central government because the head of the NDPC is appointed by the president. In the run up to the general elections the Presidential Candidate of the New Patriotic Party NPP suggested that his vice-candidate would head the NDPC if he won the elec- tion; this type of statement has been heard on various political platforms.
Whether headed by a vice-candidate or any individual duly appointed by the president, the NDPC is obliged by section 11 f to issue approved development policies as directed by the president to guide MMDAs and other public sector agencies as well the private sector.
What is the essence of the public hearing? Is it a mere formality? Where is the originality of the MMDAs in planning development and where is their autonomy? Financial constraints of local governments: Troubles with DACF Though local governments in Ghana have been bestowed with 86 functions to perform under Act , these responsibilities are not commensurate with the requisite financial resources.
The capacities of most of the assemblies have become thwarted as a result of their small sources of revenue. Unduly depending on the central government for such a source of finance, the DACF has been used by the central government variously to hold the DAs to ransom. The moneys are at times delayed, while the administrator of the fund in most cases deducts part of the moneys at source.
The decisions of the DACF have been usurped by the central government so that the DAs remain as talking shops without finance to implement their decisions. For instance, deductions are made at source without the knowledge of the DAs; continued central control has reduced the potency of the DACF as an effec- tive instrument of decentralization and democratization; the introduction of the DACF under Act as an incentive to augment revenue base of District Assemblies appears to have made most of the Assemblies renege on their local resource internally generated funds mobilization efforts; the DACF is also suffering from irregularities in the disbursement of funds, a lack of transparency and a lack of discretion afforded to district authorities over the allocation of funds.
In most cases, the DACF, which is the major source of revenues to local governments, get delayed for two to three quarters. For instance, the late and non-payment of the DACF and other non-statutory funds for the period — posed major challenge to the MMDAs in their attempt to carry out their functions bestowed by Article and the Local Government Act, Act Granted without admitting that the state does not have enough funds; is it the moneys 5—7.
Fiscal decentralization has not been promoted; this is because composite budgeting has not been effectively implemented because of the unwillingness of the Ministry of Finance. Because these appear to favour the central govern- ment, they still exist in the legal framework underpinning decentralization in Ghana.
This ideally requires adequate technical personnel to effectively carry out these activities at the local level. However, DAs are confronted with inadequate technical and competent personnel, especially in the rural areas. In most of the DAs, it is commonplace to find one official doubling as the budget officer, planning officer and even coordinating director.
Whilst this puts stress on performance and service delivery, what is more problematic is the conflict of interest and lack of checks and bal- ances, which could lead to unbridled usurpation of powers and abuses. While devolution of author- ity imposes increasing demands for services at the local level and requires well-trained local functionaries, the economic conditions of Ghana and administrative and structural reforms suggest less government spending on human resources and fewer government agents.
Lack of autonomy to recruit and dismiss personnel without the interference of the ministry of local government is not only frustrating but an impediment to effective decentralized local governance.
Rondinelli argues that leadership, responsibility and service are sine qua non for decentralization to advance the course of economic and social development. There is, therefore, an unwillingness of the leadership of decentral- ized departments and agencies to cede power to the local government leadership, refusing full integration Ahwoi, ; Ayee, ; Crook, ; Mohan, A number of statutory enactments have been made to effectively nullify the broad constitutional mandate.
African governments have appeared, in the past, not to have put any serious premium on local governments as agencies for development because of their very structures, functions and roles, that were inherited at independence and have remained unchanged for a very long time Ahwoi, Kauzya proposed a capable, intelligent and effective framework to ensure a strong public administration in the local governments.
Recommendations for effective decentralization: A comprehensive framework From the discussion above, one could that various governments come and go, but they comfort- ably inherit the structures without bringing about any real transformations.
The argument is that, when in opposition, they do promise better alternatives; but when given political power the imple- mentation of those ideas appears illusory. The framework above is therefore referred to as walk- the-talk model. The model posits that enhancing the effectiveness of MMDAs in Ghana requires a strong political will from a president who is willing to genuinely shed most of his appointment powers.
A president who is able to transform intentions to actions would make the enforcement of genuine decentralization a reality. This is because, it appears that every presidential aspirant had good plans for local governments but, upon assuming power, these become marginalized and only ideal; whilst, in reality, they keep the status quo with little or no incremental transformations at the periphery.
The walk-the-talk model argues that a strong political will is required to ensure financial breakthrough, personnel breakthrough and the required autonomy of District Assemblies to take relevant decisions that really emanate from the people and not the principal-agent type currently faced. We argue that moneys due District Assemblies as prescribed by the District Assembly Common Fund Act, Act , should be released on time and the challenges shrouded with it should practically be resolved. This will enable the District Assembleis carry out their activities and plans without obstructions.
More importantly, the political heads of the local governments should be elected by the local population in order to be held accountable.
Although this has been debated in the literature see Ahwoi, , electing the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives MMDCEs will help resolve most of the challenges that confront local governments today and will help make the elected leaders relatively independent of the centre and responsive to the local communities.
The MMDCE will not have to walk on the tightrope of double-edged accountability being faced today; a major dilemma they face today is the extent to which their loyalty and accountability goes to the president or local people. Again, in order to tackle the human resources challenges, there should be regular training of MMDA staff with the view of equipping them with the relevant skills needed for their job descriptions, rather than simply mass-training efforts.
Another important requirement is to take a comprehensive view of the legal framework and the various sections and clauses, which have existed since the colonial era, that tend to transfer most of the moneys ideally meant for local governments. The clauses that tend to make the local govern- ments take second place when it comes to local planning and decision making need to be amended, repealed or abrogated.
Walk-the-talk framework. The key challenges of decentralization are well acknowledged by the government and key stakeholders; in recent times there has been a popular survey by the Constitutional Review Commission, where most of these resurfaced.
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